Print

Please login or register.
1 Hour 1 Day 1 Week 1 Month Forever
Login with username, password and session length.

[Geoff]

Okay, so lets bring it back to life again with a couple fo statements:
 
- Jellico knew that the underwater protection of his early dreadnoughts was not as good as it could be.
 
- The loss of Audatious shows how effective a mine can be if it goes off in the wrong(right) place
 
- Prewar battle practice showed that if a fleet in a long line was attacked on mass with torpedoes, even from long range, by probability something like 30% of ships would be hit because they all sailed in a long line close together to maximise firepower. This was known as a "browning attack". As it happens this was exposed to be overly pesimistic but why take a chance.
 
- The Germans had the same problem but figued if the worst thing possible happened and they fell under the massed guns of the Grand Fleet having crossed their "T" they should practice a battle turnaway - basically the last ship in the line does 180 degree turn followed immediatley by the next in line and so forth. To cover this withdrawl (run away) they planned to used mass torpedo attacks which is exacltly what Jellico feared.
 
- Why take the chance, turn away, minimise damage and finish the fight tomorrow.
 
- The reality is Hipper outfought Beatty (I seem to recall that Beatty chaged course just before the action which threw all the gunnery solutions and that the greater range of guns of the his battlecrusiers was not therefore explouited and the Germans actually opened fire first.
 
- However we need to reflect that whilst Hipper outfought Beattty, Beatty tactically outfought Hipper by leading his battlecrusiers into the guns of the Grand Fleet. The slight speed advantage ofthe british ships forced Hipper back on the HSF thus denying intelligence to Sheer.
 
- Sheer blundered obliviously into the guns of the GF. Whilst suffering unaceptable losses (due poor amunition handling) the british battlecrusiers tactically did exactly what they intended to do! So Jellico outfought Sheer, twice!
 
Let the debate continue!
 
G

[Colin Bishop]

I think that's pretty much correct Geoff. Hipper was probably a better commander than either Beatty or Scheer.

I am still ploughing through the American analysis of the battle (wonderful just before going to sleep!) The author makes some good points but to my mind falls short in two areas. Firstly he is a bit too 'gung ho' and happy to sacrifice major ships to get a 'result' and secondly I don't think he has any real idea of North Sea weather conditions with shifting visibility (especially combined with the smoke) and the effect that it had on decision making.

He is however right in criticising Jellicoe's subordinates at all levels for their failures to keep the C in C informed at all stages of the battle and the time leading up to it. Even when reports were accurate they were often nullified by the reporting ship being miles out in its estimated position. Reporting would have been more effective if bearings etc. could have been given by reference to a point that both the reporting ship and the C in C could relate to, for example the position of the 5th Battle Squadron once fleet action had been joined. Many of the messages seem to have been very scrappy and not helpful to the recipients when they actually got through.

It is interesting to speculate what Jellicoe would have done had he realised that Scheer was actually passing astern of him during the night. Probably he would have hauled off to the eastwards to get between Scheer and his base for a daylight resumption of the fighting.

Something else  which is perhaps not given enough emphasis is that on both sides many of the crews were exhausted from hard fighting and hours of strict concentration, something which was bound to have affected judgement. A good proportion of ships had also suffered severe damage and casualties which would have affected their fighting efficiency.

There were some odd occurrences though, such as the decision of the commander of some of Scheer's best destroyers to bale out and go home via the Kattegatt  whilst the reluctance of Captain Fairie to take his forces into action during the night is inexplicable.

That's the thing about Jutland, it was such a complex operation that there are things to discuss whichever part of the battle you look at.

Colin

[Archie2004]

In the photographs of these battleships I notice forward-facing diagonal boom like structures along the hulls and have always wondered what purpose they served, did they carry anti-torpedo nets?

[Colin Bishop]

Yes, they were torpedo nets but most were removed as the war progressed as being unnecessary when the fleet was based at Scapa Flow. At Jutland, one of the German battlecruisers was hit causing the nets to come loose and trail in the water, they had to stop the ship to cut it away otherwise there was a good chance it would have got caught round the propellers.

Also, new improved larger and faster torpedoes could penetrate the nets anyway.

Colin

[dodes]

Hi Colin, another point not often made is Jellicoe just prior to the war was tasked with inspecting the gunnery ability and effectiveness of the British guns and munitions, so actually knowing the problems he may have been a bit cautious off getting into a pell mell affair.

[raflaunches]

After reading Gordon's rules of the game, I think Jellioce was the cautious man because of many things that happened in the 1890s but he was a man who understood the technology of the time, the shooting of the Grand Fleet was excellent compared to that of the Battlecruiser Fleet under Beatty. Evan-Thomas and  Jellicoe were respectable men who knew their ships and were not afraid to get into battle, they wanted the best circumstances to engage the enemy which they would have had if Beatty had not rushed in. His direct order to increase the rate of fire which caused the stacking of cordite in the turrets, corridors and leaving the doors open which led to the loss of the two Battlecruisers under his command. If he understood his ship's abilities like Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas he wouldn't have lost his advantages and the battle would have perhaps ended very differently.
Jellicoe's standing orders were to maintain the blockade of the German Fleet and his turn away from the TBDs saved his fleet from the 31 torpedos that were fired at them, and with the German High Seas Fleet retreating in a well practiced manoeuvre with the first three leading battleships badly damaged, Jellicoe obeyed his orders and ensured the Royal Navy remained dominant and the blockade stood.

[ballastanksian]

How on earth do you enforce a blockade if your fleet is wracked and reduced to ineffect? You have to measure your desire to engage in an all out battle, to whit considerable losses would be acceptable, and play the long game. We made some mistakes but as a whole the RN helped the allies bring a major war to an armistice:O/

If things had been a bit different, Jutland II would have occurred in August IIRC.

Seeing some of the ships represented as models last weekend brought it home to me how pwerful the battlefleets were.

[raflaunches]

Exactly correct Ian


Jellicoe did what was expected of him by the Admiralty but not by the British people. If he had turned towards the torpedos potentially he could have lost possibly 1/3 of his ships and reduced his numerical superiority over the German fleet. A lot of lessons were learnt from Jutland by the Royal Navy and a lot was forgotten by the Germans twenty years later in WW2. It just wasn't a trafalgar expected by the British public. The German admiralty was very good at propaganda but realised that their own people wouldn't believe it if they saw their ships after Jutland so they put up a huge wall around Kiel so they couldn't see the Seydlitz, Koeing, Grosser Kurfürst or any other battered ships as this would have destroyed the effect of the proclaimed victory. The Royal Navy had ships to replace the losses, the Germans didn't.

[ballastanksian]

We had Dreadnoughts in refit while the KM would still have had to rely on Predreadnoughts with but one Bayern to strengthen the battle line. The latter would have focussed Jellicoe's thoughts somewhat!

[warspite]

I don't know why they didn't just give chase after the threat of the torpedoes, they knew where they were heading to, sitting offshore shelling the port and ships would have been a more safer option, running in at 12-14 miles before turning for a broadside before retreating to a safer distance from the shore batteries, it could have resulted in more KM losses - or was it just not cricket. 

[Colin Bishop]

The approaches to the German bases were thick with minefields.

Colin

[warspite]

12-14 miles out?

[warspite]

Oh I see, the danes may not have appreciated 150 uk warships pounding Germany off their coastline 

[Colin Bishop]

Further out than that I believe plus there were also a number of submarines for coastal defence.

Colin

[Geoff]

The problem was that the visibility was very poor and Jellico did not know the direction of the Germans had taken. Remember after their first turn around the Germans did another and again Jellico crossed their "T". The lateness of the hour precluded against a major night engagement.

In terms of turning around and pursuing the Germans, firstly you have to know precisely which direction they went and secondly how do you catch a fleet steaming at 18 knots when you are steaming at 18 knots? No one has really answered this question!

Jellico knew and the Germans knew one of the tactics when fleeing the battle was to lay mines and torpedoes in their wake. This is exactly what the Japanese did at Tuishima with good effect.

Fundamentally why take a chance when you can finish them off the next day. The fact the German were able to slip away was just luck.

Many re-enactments of Jutland have been played out and none of them have produced a crushing victory or an easier solution. Even dividing the fleet was considered pre war but the danger of one section being overwhelmed was too great. Ships streaming in opposite directions for 10 mins are completely out of sight of each other.

Visibility was generally so bad the Germans blundered into Jellico and the same visibility let them get away.

Pre war exercises