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[RaaArtyGunner]

Struth is it mornin  must open da blinds  and a gidday to ya self  Derek

[Jimmy James]

Returning to the thread ... I thought Admiral Woodward did an outstanding job in an almost imposable situation. 
Remember
1) The fleet was fitted out in a few hrs  (Not Weeks or Months )
2) None of the ships or the crews were battle tested  (Drill are fine but they are not the real thing)
3) None of the missile systimes were battle tested and in fact most newer guns were not battle tested (the money people don't like to see the guns firing 4" & 5" bricks as they cost hundreds of £ s never mind missels because they cost Millions)
4) Old Gunnery people like me said it was a mistake to remove the guns but the rest is history (lots of lovely guns being remounted on warships)

BUT We got away with it ... According to the text books we should have lost... most other country's including the USA are still trying to figure out how we did it
 Out numbered,Out Gunned, Halfway around the world and in spite of the politics The ROYAL NAVY Won and at it,s head a little known Admiral called Sandy Woodward
 OK He Made Mistakes --But --HE and His Ships ,his Crews, His Troops and his Men though shear bloody mindedness  pulled it off.
Jimmy James Ex Grey Funnel Line
 

[Shipmate60]

It wasn't THAT long ago, don't you remember the political climate at the time.
Thatcher and Co had decided to decimate the RN, its support organisation and weaken the Army in favour of a slimmed down "Fast Reaction Force". There had to be a Peace Dividend, don't you know!!
Most of the units sailing to the Falklands were up for disposal or provisionally sold.
It was true that in Portsmouth, Dockyard "Mateys" were storing and preparing the ships with the redundancy letters in their pockets.
In later leaked papers the "ACCEPTABLE" losses, (as stated by Thatcher), to regain the Falklands were 1 Major Unit sunk (a Carrier) and the loss of up to 1/3 of the Task Force.

We did a superb job as we assume our Armed Forces will, yes unprepared, not the best equipment, (Material), but the best Personnel.

Yes we were lucky, but fortune favours the brave.

Mistakes were indubitably made as in Belgrano or the escorts, no AA Missiles guarding Sir Gallahad landings.

But that is war, no-one is perfect and fighting the engagement over again with 20/20 hindsight is a pointless exercise.

I think the men who fought under him should have the last say as they were actually there and anyone who just accepts the "official" version is naive.

Bob

[Bryan Young]

Every argument displayed on this thread has "good" points (ie correct), and "bad" (incorrect). Even the guys who were actually there could only see a small part of the whole. Also it may be worth bearing in mind that Admiral Woodward wasn't acting in isolation. It wasn't as if he was standing on a pedestal and just pointing a finger saying "This is my decision, so let it be done".
All 3 services made mistakes. Is that so surprising?
There are a few good books written about this conflict, and I for one would seriously recommend some of the "posters" to read them before launching off into "stuff" they have no real conception of.
My personal interest still lies with the as yet untold true story that led to the air attack on the 2 LSLs in Fitzroy. I believe that all 4 (yes,4) organisations were at fault here. The 4th? Well the LSLs were RFA manned.....with civilian Chinese crews who had been "promised" that they wouldn't be put in harms way. I wonder who told them that. Another point of concern (to me, at least), was the habit of the RN to "hide" behind a large RFA. I don't believe for one moment that this was a decision made by "staff", but more a rather callous instinct for "self preservation" by sundry RN COs. Don't believe me? Well I had many a long chat with my fellow RFA Officers after the conflict and all of them thought that they'd been treated as sacrificial goats....even thos in a fully loaded ammo ship. In common with these guys, my earlier "respect" for the RN took a severe nosedive from which it never recovered in my remaining 12 years service with the RFA. Regards to all of you. Bryan Young.

[Turbulent]

Ask those that served under him if he was a good commander - out of interest, were you actually there?

[Shipmate60]

Nope, I was on standby for the first ship to leave UK.

Bob

[allnightin]

Every argument displayed on this thread has "good" points (ie correct), and "bad" (incorrect). Even the guys who were actually there could only see a small part of the whole.
 
 Another point of concern (to me, at least), was the habit of the RN to "hide" behind a large RFA. I don't believe for one moment that this was a decision made by "staff", but more a rather callous instinct for "self preservation" by sundry RN COs. Don't believe me? Well I had many a long chat with my fellow RFA Officers after the conflict and all of them thought that they'd been treated as sacrificial goats....even thos in a fully loaded ammo ship. In common with these guys, my earlier "respect" for the RN took a severe nosedive from which it never recovered in my remaining 12 years service with the RFA.

Bryan,

Firstly what part of my earlier post was wrong please?

Secondly you make a pretty sweeping statement about the RN hiding behind RFAs that I find very hard to accept.  Can you give any actual details or are you going to tar the entire campaign with this particular brush?   As I understood it the RN escorts at San Carlos were specifically stationed up threat to take main brunt of the Argentine air attacks and protect the landing ships.

Francis Macnaughton

[Bryan Young]

Francis.
Nothing about yours. Your posting was more factual than some of the "surmises" and "knee-jerks" of some of the earlier ones.
I'm not backtracking or prevaricating here.
Secondly, it wasn't a "sweeping statement" about RN ships "hiding" behind larger ships.....but I apologize for the word "habit". I shouldn't have used that word.
It's never been my intention to "tar the entire campaign with this particular brush".....only to say that it did happen. I referred to subsequent conversations with my fellow RFA officers, and my "quotes" came from 2 senior Engineer officers (on different ships), but there were strong "hints" from others. One instance would be enough, but 3 or 4 just wouldn't be acceptable. No. I'm not going to name names or name the ships. As in all my other postings I have endeavoured to just tell the truth....accept it, or not. Up to you.
BY.

[Perkasaman2]

Bryan is expressing a viewpoint essentially as a member of the RFA. His view is understandable regarding RN involvement in the campaign, and it is well supported by the events and outcomes with regard to the fate of many ships in the task force. The Argentinian planners probably did their homework re our ship's AA capability and they deployed their air power effectively, albeit with losses, especially when units closed with the island for the landing  operations. RFA ships appear to be virtually unarmed and require effective protection, sadly,  many of the RN ships involved in the campaign appear to have been barely able to defend themselves. Back home, at the time, many, including me,  were shocked at the apparent lack of suitable or effective AA weaponry on our megga £££££££ modern warships. The RN fleet certainly lacked credability at this time and appeared to be quite 'unfit for purpose', when facing modern aircraft.
Ultimately, a good commander should be fully conversant with his ships and the requirements, virtues/limitations of their individual weapon systems and deploy them accordingly. The board of enquiry report describes the sequence of events and contributory factorsand does little to exonerate RN personnel involved. Thankfully, the taskforce was successful in spite of the tragic losses (on both sides).      

[engineroom]

I agree with Bryan and I can speak with some experience as I am also exRFA and was down South with the Task Force, first on Operation Paraquet the recapture of South Georgia and then on to Operation Corporate.  The RN at that time, or one or two elements of it anyway, did 'hide' behind the larger RFA's, it is a little disconcerting to be closed up at Defence Stations and hearing gunfire from your own ships close by.

Mind you it is also a bit brown trouser time to be in the boiler room during an air attack and listening to the dud bombs dropping into the water close to the ship, it would have continued that way (the dud bombs) if the bloody BBC and Daily Mirror had not announced to the world that the Argies were setting the fuses wrongly, at least with dud bombs you only hear the splash and don't experience the bang which would have seriously messed up my leave plans.

[mog10]

Sandy Woodward had a job to do to which he did well certain opium's should be kept to one's self and this is one of them !!!
unless people are slagging somebody off it seems forum members arn't happy!
just  another sign of the times i suppose

[Bryan Young]

Continuing this thread but at one stage removed, I wrote about my experiences on a STUFT. It was relayed on this forum under the "Nautical, Strange But True" banner. Perhaps some of the more recent members of the forum may care to read it. It starts off  on March 2nd 2009 (reply no.236). Just a thought! BY.

[allnightin]

Bryan,

I dutifully read your bits under Strange but True as far as the Falklands were concerned but I am, if anything, even more perplexed by your claim about RN ships hiding behind RFAs.  You say in one bit about this being seen in exercise scenarios which doesn't make any sense to me at all.  I am approaching this from a destroyer or frigate perspective (which was the starting point of the thread about ANTELOPE and Sandy Woodward) and the last thing you want when in an escort is your sensor and weapon arcs blocked by a large vessel when there is a threat in that direction.  In an exercise the aim is to make the most of the training opportunities and hiding isn't going to do much for that.

By any chance are you talking about the carriers, where I suppose that their mission critical status would mean that they were stationed where the Argentinian attacks would be least able to find them?  And are you talking about the pre-ordered stationing of the whole force or the last minute manoeuvering by individual ships in response to an attack being detected?

With AMBUSCADE we were usually out at 5 - 10 miles from the force centre on anti submarine patrol and EW picket.  That meant that we were the first to be picked up by the attacking Etendards on 25th May and duly targeted by the Exocets.  It is generally reckoned that the missiles were attracted to our chaff and passed close astern of AMBUSCADE.  Unfortunately ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was then in the missiles' field of view and without chaff herself could do nothing to prevent the Exocets hitting.  I understood that she was out from the centre of the force because she was about to be sent into San Carlos but there was certainly no thought that she represented a shield for us - our response to the attack was to launch chaff and turn onto a pre determined course until the missiles had passed through.  That is straight fact because I was the on-watch OOW that carried out the manoeuvre.

[Bryan Young]

Francis, another cogent and thoughtful reply; although one seen from one ships viewpoint. Ships were all over the place (as you well know) and not just in San Carlos as was the impression promulgated at the time and still seems to be the general publics belief.
I deliberately didn't give ships names or locations as that would (to my mind) have been unproductive. I also honestly believe that you are telling the truth as you saw it. My information did come from senior RFA officers during conversations held over a period of years.
There were also a couple of other replies that do tend to bear me out. It was never my intention to tarnish the reputation of the entire RN Task Force....indeed, I could almost quote chapter and verse the comments made by some RFA officers about other RFA officers. All I was trying to get through was that not everybody always behaved within the highest traditions of either service. And I certainly wouldn't presume to comment or pass on any judgement against any other service, that's for others to do.
      I can only stand by what was reported to me (without prompting, I may add) by people who I've known and trusted for many years.
      Sorry if I've ruffled a few feathers. Regards. Bryan.

[allnightin]

Since Bryan's last post here he has sent me a PM to explain that in fact the practice of hiding behind non-combatants in an exercise scenario was not by the RN but another nation.  Thanks for clarifying this Bryan.

As to what did or didn't happen in 1982 my view is based not just on the experiences mentioned earlier but also serving with and talking to many other RN (and some RFA) colleagues in subsequent appointments who were there.  As virtually all of my time afloat has been in frigates I can only say that the CO of  an escort would be utterly failing in his task if he was deliberately manoeuvering to put his ship downthreat of the high value unit he is meant to be protecting when it was under actual attack.  I spent next to no time in the carriers or other big ships  so I can't answer for them but I would point out that, for any sheltering to work, the three elements involved (warship, RFA and threat) would have to be kept very near a straight line.  This would require some pretty hefty ship manoeuvering that large ships would be pressed to achieve.  So I am still left wondering what your senior oficers actually saw and what the imminent threat was.

Engineroom are you able to be a bit more specific on what sort of scenario you were talking about?

There have been plenty of books written about the Falklands that spell out exactly what went wrong during specific incidents - GLAMORGAN going through the Exocet zone and management of Sea Harriers for example.  Perhaps I need to read a few more - any suggestions for one that also mentions this issue?

[engineroom]

Allnightin since my last post I have spoken to one of my colleagues who was on the same ship in the Falklands, the Naval unit I mentioned that was 'hiding' was in fact there legitimately and was HMS Broadsword and she was actually off our beam as she had come up the convoy to take on an impending excocet threat,  So I seem to have got that mixed up with another incident and I apologise for that, however the aother incident is this,  during one action stations we had a Sea King 'hiding' off our port side, and that is not a mistake becasue the pilot concerned was told to Fox trot Oscar by our very irate Captain who laetr reported him, the name of the pilot is familiar to everyone but I will not name him.

One thing that a number of RFA men noticed was that whilst we were attached to the Carrier Battle Group, RFA's always seemed to be placed upthreat of the carriers which always seemed a bit silly to me.  I know that you will say that the Carriers were a very important asset and the argies did in fact claim to have sunk one, but 8,000 miles form home with limited logistic assets would it not have been a bit smarter to deploy a Sea Wolf capable frigate upthreat of the carriers and not a very lightly armed RFA full of things that go bang, after all if you lose one of your fleet tankers or an ammunition ship that would have seriously compromised the whole operation.

One good book you might like to read is "No Sea Too Rough" by Geoff Puddefoot and published by Chatham.  It is the story of the RFA in the Falklands and whilst the author was not one of us, his material is drawn from official papers and first hand accounts from RFA seamen who were there, I am sure you will find it interesting.

[dave301bounty]

This brings a bit of a chill ,one of my relatives went down on the container ship ,and another relative was wounded enough to be shipped back to u k .these conflicts ,all  a political  ploy .

[snowwolflair]

A thought to ponder. 

When I was on Argus at Portsmouth last week they told me that as their radar was so much higher than the frigates they "spot" aircraft over the horizon for the Type 42, 22and 23's.

RFAs in the Falklands conflict had similar height advantage, could this be a reason for them to operate together in the way they did?

Certainly a Rover class tanker would have towered over a Leander or a Type 21 or Type 22.

As for SeaKings hiding, they are dammed "hot" targets and if you are being attacked you want them behind a cold hull or they will act as a magnet to heat seaking missiles.  It was the heat that they produced that made them ideal Exocet decoys.  The captain told them to get lost as he would be doing his best to keep his ship heat signature down.

[justboatonic]

I cant believe some people are getting their panties in a knot regarding grammar, punctuation and spelling on a forum. Especially since the thread is really about sacrificing men and ships during the Falklands.

Yes, we all know the navy had been subject to savage budget cuts leaving ships ill prepared to defend themselves. We all know the navy had become a 'blue water' navy and had perhaps forgotten about close in conflicts.

Point is, woodward \ Woodward for want of a better word sacrificed at least two ships in Antelope and Coventry. Dont take my word for it, read or listen to Coventry's captain explaining the circumstances of the loss of his ship. The BoI documents disturbing facts about Antelope's preparation and readiness for her nonetheless sterling effort in San Carlos Water.

Obviously, people will have different opinions to me. I dont have a problem with that per se. But, if the argentine air force had of set their bomb detonators correctly, woodward would most certainly have lost far more ships (and hence men) and been forced to withdraw.

Oh btw, Im really not going to go through this post looking for grammatical errors and correct them so sorry in advance if anyone is offended.

[RaaArtyGunner]

Oh btw, Im really not going to go through this post looking for grammatical errors and correct them so sorry in advance if anyone is offended.

[malcolmfrary]

Yes, we all know the navy had been subject to savage budget cuts leaving ships ill prepared to defend themselves. We all know the navy had become a 'blue water' navy and had perhaps forgotten about close in conflicts.

Point is, woodward \ Woodward for want of a better word sacrificed at least two ships in Antelope and Coventry.

The REAL question is "Given your current viewpoint of 100% perfect hindsight, what would YOU have done that would have resulted in less casualties and still have recovered the Falklands?".
The only way that you get a war without losses is if the losing side decides to start without any weapons, and surrender immediately.