Model Boat Mayhem
The Shipyard ( Dry Dock ): Builds & Questions => Navy - Military - Battleships: => Topic started by: jtbyte on October 29, 2015, 10:24:08 am
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British Dreadnought Classes
Dreadnought Class[/size] - HMS Dreadnought - Laid down 1905. Completed 1906.
Bellerophon Class - HMS Bellerophon, Superb, Temeraire - Laid down 1906-1907. Completed 1909.
St. Vincent Class - HMS St. Vincent, Vanguard, Collingwood - Laid down 1907-1908. Completed 1909-1910.
Neptune Class - HMS Neptune - Laid down 1909. Completed 1911.
Colossus Class - HMS Colossus, Hercules - Laid down 1909. Completed 1911.
Orion Class - HMS Orion, Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer - Laid down 1909-1910. Completed 1912.
King George V Class - HMS King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Audacious - Laid down 1911. Completed 1912-1913.
Iron Duke Class - HMS Iron Duke, Marlborough, Benbow, Emperor of India - Laid down 1912. Completed 1914.
Erin Class - HMS Erin - Laid down 1911. Completed 1914
Agincourt Class - HMS Agincourt - Laid down 1911. Completed 1914
Queen Elizabeth Class - HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant, Malaya - Laid down 1912-1913. Completed 1915-1916.
Canada - HMS Canada - Laid down 1911. Completed 1915.
Royal Sovereign Class - HMS Royal Sovereign, Revenge, Royal Oak, Resolution, Ramillies - Laid down 1913-1914. Completed 1916-1917.
I acquired some drawings of a few dreadnoughts a while back and wanted to know the classes they belonged to. Came across the list above and thought others might be interested.
Reagards,
JT
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Surely only dreadnoughts belonged to the dreadnought class all other classes listed were different classes of battleship. Or have I missed something?
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All battleships built after Dreadnought were referred to as Dreadnought class even though they were split up into smaller sub classes which are listed above. I think after the KGV class of WW1 they were sometimes referred to as super dreadnoughts whilst you could say that the first battleship to break from the traditional dreadnought designation was the Nelson/Rodney.
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Orion and co. were regarded as Super Dreadnoughts by the press when built - 13.5" guns and superfiring turrets making them just that bit more Super.
Andy
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If anyone should know about Dreadnaughts it must be "dreadnaught72" O0
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:embarrassed: The time it takes to build one is something I certainly know about! {:-{
For what it's worth, what I find interesting in the naming debate is the situation with the battlecruisers.
Initially referred to as large armoured ships, then cruiser-battleships and dreadnought cruisers, the emphasis was (correctly) on the concept of a large, fast, armoured cruiser able to out-run and defeat any other cruiser, and conduct long-range commerce raiding.
By 1908 Jacky Fisher, stirring up popular support via the press for the public, referred to them as battlecruisers - a title adopted officially by the Admiralty in 1911.
I think, at this point, their fate was sealed. While Invincible and Inflexible performed in the role they were designed for at the Falklands in 1914, that early success didn't highlight their drawbacks. As battlecruisers they were always going to be tied to the main battlefleet and, being hopelessly badly armoured, suffer the consequences.
...of course the whole naming convention rather breaks down by the time of the Fast Battleships (Warspite), the last Battlecruiser (Hood) and Fisher's totally nuts Large Light Cruisers (Courageous), the latter pretty much good for nothing, except perhaps "hulls for aircraft carriers". %%
Andy, whose anorak is thick today. :-))
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So JT, Which one are you planning to build?
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I recently sent away to the National Maritime Museum for the drawings list of several of the above vessels. I wanted to be sure of what drawings were actually available for various ships and then decide which, ship, or ships, I would research further for a model. I like these old battleships and have always wanted to tackle one of them. When the list of drawings for each of the vessels I requested arrived I was initially very pleased with what drawings were listed. However, when I learned how much these drawings were going to cost I needed to sit down with a Brandy and very strong black coffee. Apparently the museum has to adopt new methods of producing the drawings and this means first scanning them. Excellent ideal you may think, until you understand that if you are the first person to order a drawing that has not yet been scanned, and those I requested have not, then it is going to cost you £70.00 per plan. So, in answer to your question I am going to build a 100” P51 Mustang with my son and forget the ideal of a Dreadnought for a few years, if not forever. I hope that answers your question.
Thank God I have collected many builders drawings over the years and have plenty to choose from. God only knows what it would cost today to build the collection I have.
Regards, JT
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Thing is, when you divide that enormous cost by the hours you'd need to put into it (planking my decks alone took 100 hours+) then the final cost of plans, when you factor in the materials, and once subsumed by the labour, is pretty minimal.
I think for a project like this, you really need to love and have an attachment to the subject. It is a marathon, and you need the psychological staying power to get to the end.
Andy
+ That's 100 hours on the task itself - not including loading the kettle, cleaning up, setting up, contemplating my navel, taking a sly five minute breather.
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There are many things we can do Andy that require great devotion to the subjects we attempt. I always produce my own drawings from the builder’s drawings before I even start a project. It’s just my way of doing things but I like it that way and enjoy it. That requires many hours of accurate research and work also. And, like you I have spent many hours planking decks too, and even setting the standing and running rigging of 74 gunners for months on end after making the rope itself. Talk to guys who build planes and gliders, or steam engines and trains. They are all devoted to what they are doing and they love every minute of it. That does not excuse prices like this. Not that there is much we can do about it! By the way I like the photos. JT.
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Some of the NMS drawings are pretty large so it may indeed cost a lot to reproduce them. If you are the only prospective customer then you may have to bear that cost. Not many people actually want plans so there isn't a thriving market to spread the cost.
Colin
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I always produce my own drawings from the builder’s drawings before I even start a project. It’s just my way of doing things but I like it that way and enjoy it.
Me too ... Not least to get a first "feel" of how big the blinkin' thing might be. But there's also a degree of learning about the subject, which - I'd argue - you can't get by slavishly following someone else's plans.
Andy
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Yes Collin, in some cases it may be that larger drawings may cost more. However, having purchased quite a few drawings from the NMM I have noticed that large and small drawings have each been charged for at the same price, and this has been the case from other archives. I think its just that the new system of scanning the drawing first has to be paid for and the first person to ask for a drawing not yet scanned is going to get hit. It’s a shame really because the system is long over due and does need to be done. But, at the same time the method of charging like this for the first scan is not going to be popular, and may in fact turn even more people off. There are after all other archives that also hold some very interesting vessel drawings, and even to get drawings from the US, as I have also done, is not that expensive overall. But, as I said early there isn’t much we can do anyway.
I absolutely agree with you Andy. It’s always best to do your own work from the very beginning. After all, when it’s all done and you sit back and look at it you know inside it’s all yours. And then of course the proverbial, what’s next? JT
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You probably already have these Andy, but I was just looking over a few of them and thought you might like to see them anyway. I dont know who drew them but they are kind of nice to look at. The first is Malaya and the second is Queen Elizabeth. I had to reduce them to get them in so they don't really come out so good. Anyway...
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I wonder if the fact that individuals take the hit simply reflects the general lack of demand for drawings so there is no incentive to develop a more equitable system of charging? The reality is that marine model making is very much a niche interest/hobby and scratch building these days is a small niche within a niche. One has to see these things in perspective. Perhaps we should be grateful that the material is available at all, when I first started scale modelling accurate information was very difficult if not impossible to obtain.
Colin
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The sobering thought is there is no such thing as an accurate model only degrees of representation and in some respects that also applies to builders drawings. To be fair to the NMM or any other source retrieving a drawing that is not already been copied in whatever format some persons time has to be accounted for. The question is if there is no alternative and you really would like to build a particular model then a cost will incur.
Bowwave
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Are the images from the anatomy of a ship book?
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To be honest I don't remember where I got them, but they are not from the place you mention.
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As Bowwave says......'a drawing that is not already been copied in whatever format some persons time has to be accounted for'
Such archival Drawing offices may hold 1000's of ships plans, however that if 1000 ships O0, as each vessels listing may contain scores of individual sub plan sets...so your NMM may actually store hundreds of thousands of plans
These may also be size AO or larger and must be hung vertically down in an air controlled atmosphere
One request for an unscanned plan...must first be found, verified [usually by a second person] then post the the scanning and electronic archival which again must be verified by a second higher rating employee
Imagine if you ordered a paid for a drawing of the Victory hull lines and ended up with a copy of Noahs Ark water lines...you would not be happy >>:-(.....nor would you accept an excuse 'that some dingbat scanned the wrong drawing {-)...and after all....a boat is a boat....cannot you just change it a bit to suit?'
Such is the need for accurate documentation, and this must start at the source....and be paid for .......... Derek
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Hi JT, I ordered a set of drawings for HMS Achilles (the drawings were of Natal and Cochrane to be specific) from the NMM, and as I understod it, they have a set of scanners and printers that don't do much more than 1:1 scale prints, so they cannot currently manipulate the drawings.
My set of lines, main and weather deck drawings plus admin and postage came to about £70-£80, so all in all about £25 per sheet. I saved some money up and asked for part of the cost as a Christmas present :-) If you have a lare enough workshop wall, you can work from them direct, but it is better and more managable to have them reduced to your chosen model scale.
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Hi Ballastanksian, It may be that they had already been scanned, but even so the price you mentioned does not match any price per sheet that I have paid in the past. They used to be £17.28 per sheet copied, and before that cheaper again. The last copies that I purchased were for Nile gunboats and that was a few of months back before the current changes apparently came in. These of course were the photocopies they used to supply.
All the drawings I have were all done 1:1. I was always under the impression that this was the normal manner of copying the drawings. I am sure there must have been exceptions, but it has never happened to me. Anyway, what you say is very interesting and makes me very curious.
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Yes, thats about what I paid. If they are charging £70 per sheet now then they will deter model builders from using their resources.
That would be sad <:(
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'If they are charging £70 per sheet now then they will deter model builders from using their resources.'
Probably true but will it bother them? They aren't really into models these days and I don't expect they derive much net income from supplying plans.
Colin
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Not good news if its going to be £70 a sheet. I paid about that for three sheets for Iron Duke (lines, weather deck and forecastle deck). If I had wanted all the plansit was in the region of £600! Howerver realistically you don't need anywhere near all the plans to build an accurate model.
Again I was told they dont scale them so they all come in at 1/48 so were near 16 feet long!
Sadly the maritime museum is not really into models any more and the wonderfull collection they used to have is in storage. I was told, but don't know if it is true, that when they did their major regeneration project some years ago it came with PC connotations so all had to be touchy feely envoronmental stuff. Hardley a mention of the British Empire as its not PC! The last time I was there was some time ago but from memory our entire maritime history was showcased in about 50 feet albeit thier was one very large model of a WW2 KGV class but nothing like the rooms full of models that they used to have. The British Empire is sadly being airbrushed out of history!
I believe the Science Museum in London has also closed their maritime section - apparently no demand - perhaps if they advertised a bit it would help but then doubtless that would be un PC as well!
All very sad :((
The only potential shining light is at Chatham, which has got a lot better, where there are a number of builders models on display but they are badly presented in a dark room with spotllights and no photography permitted
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On an entirely different note lets turn the discussion back to Dreadnoughts. I have always thought that the comparison between British and German batleships has been unfair as they compare like classes with like classes typically based on the lay down date. However in reality because we built faster later british dreadnoughts were available to match the older designed German battleships.
For example on the day at Jutland, our latest ships were Revenge class (Revenge and Royal Oak I believe). so 15" guns and 13" armour against 12" guns and 14" armour - Koineg class. This means you need to compare the Queen Elizabeths to the next German class down etc. If you compare numbers of ships, ship for ship a different picture emerges.
Okay so lets move post Jutland and you get two Baden class v 4 Revenge class. Koineg class v 4 Queen elizabeths and so on. All a very different picture!
Okay let the discussion begin!
Cheers
G :-)
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^ fair point.
SMS Blucher the same date as HMS Invincible ... No contest there.
Andy
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Most naval historians agree that the RN lost the tactical advantage at Jutland and the battle but retained the strategic advantage which was far more important than a single engagement. The quality of shells used by the RN at Jutland was poor given the volume fired hits gained and damage inflicted. Worse still the Kaiserliche Marine learned the lessons from the battle of Dogger Bank the RN on the other hand did not and suffered accordingly. Post war inspection of the Baden class indicated that they no better than equivalent British battleships .yet German naval architects had a clear understanding of the advantages of subdivision and effective damage control by flooding but more importantly cordite was handled in canisters not bags as on RN capitol ships . Opening salvos from German battle cruisers and battleships was regarded as being more effective because of better optics and fire control .
Bowwave
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I would disagree as Jutland was about control of the north sea which we retained and therefore we won strategically.Whilst we lost more ships than the Germans this was principally due to criminal negligence of the officers and men within the battlecrusier fleet. After the Falklands and Dogger Bank the German survivors all commented that they felt the rate of fire from the English was slow. Within the battlecrusiers there was encouragement to increase the rate of fire and this was done by keeping magazine doors and anti flash doors open and stockpiling ammunition such that from the turret to the magazine became an extended magazine. A penetration of a turret then lit the fuse with the obvious effect. the Germans learned this lesson at Dogger Bank with Seydlitz and immediately reduced the amount of ammunition in turrets.
One of the myths of German warships was that their charges were in metal cases.This is true only to a degree as only the last part of the charge with the all important black powder igniter was contained in metal. The rest of the charge was in silk the same as the English.
With the English charges there was a black powder igniter at the rear of each quarter charge and it became standard practice to remove all four covers before loading such that is was seen as a "crime" for a charge to reach the turret with the cover still on. This also scattered a trail of black powder on the floor.
Both Beatty and Jellico were aware of the practice but turned a blind eye in the pursuit of higher rates of fire. the results were the loss of three battlecrusiers at Jutland. interestingly the gunnery officer of Lion refused to adhere to this which is probably why Lion survived the hit on \q turret.
There was a report done after Jutland which confirmed all this but it was "hidden" and the blame put on lack of deck amour!
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The beam of British battleships was constrained by the size of the dry docks available to them. The German docks were newer and wider and their ships could be wider too and this meant that the internal torpedo bulkhead could be mounted further inboard and allowed for greater subdivision. The extensive subdivision in the German ships made for poor living conditions but their crews spent much of their time in barracks ashore when the fleet was in port. British ships had to be capable of world wide service and consequently needed better conditions for their crews. However the vaunted German subdivision did have weaknesses in that the bulkheads were pierced for pipe and cable runs which resulted in many small leaks from battle damage and consequent slow waterlogging and flooding.
Interestingly, Bismarck was based on the design of Baden as that was all the Germans had to work with post war. Bismarck was a great looking ship and very large but she was a less sophisticated design than Rodney which blew her to pieces without much help from KGV. Had the G3s been built they would probably have been more than a match for Bismarck despite being older.
Another design fault carried over from the High Seas Fleet to Bismarck was the practice of running cabling and communications above the armoured deck where they were very vulnerable to damage. Another quirk of German post wars designs was that the sterns of their ships tended to fall off when stressed due to a structural discontinuity where the belt armour ended.
There's lots of interesting information available when you start comparing all these designs in detail.
Of course none of these ships had to worry about emissions in those days.... :}
Colin
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Jutland? Lots of reasons why it was not a total victory for the RN, but the first and most important reason to my mind was Beatty's utter mismanagement of the Fifth Battle Squadron. His most powerful and effective asset in the wrong place at the start of the action, and almost thrown to the lions later on after the BCs start their run to the North.
Forget battlecruisers' inherent weaknesses - I think these were only emphasised (excepting Invincible's loss) due to the lack of practical support when it was particularly needed from the Fast Battleships.
Beatty should have been court-martialled for this.
... Second thoughts, preferably after his incompetence at the Dogger Bank.
Andy
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Interestingly, Bismarck was based on the design of Baden as that was all the Germans had to work with post war. Bismarck was a great looking ship and very large but she was a less sophisticated design than Rodney which blew her to pieces without much help from KGV. Had the G3s been built they would probably have been more than a match for Bismarck despite being older.
Colin
Hardly a fair comparison as Bismarck had a damaged rudder and could not steer effectively to fight a battle against a rowing boat let alone two battleships . The G3 design would have been no more effective than the Rodney .
Bowwave %)
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I think the G3 would have been faster than the Bismarck and a bit better armoured than Rodney! True the Bismarck was unable to steer but her systems were otherwise pretty much intact but from what I have read her fire control was quickly put out of action due to the communications being routed above the armour deck. Rodney had the disadvantage that she had no high explosive shells aboard as they had all been landed prior to her impending refit in the States so basically she could only drill holes in the Bismarck with armour piercing which made it difficult to sink her. Personally I think Bismarck was overrated and a semi obsolescent design with a relatively weak armour belt (it wasn't special steel) and no dual purpose secondary armament.
Colin
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I think the G3 would have been faster than the Bismarck and a bit better armoured than Rodney!
Quoting the superiority of the G3 design over that of the Rodney with the Implication that Bismarck would have been no match in a gun duel with the G3 is like saying the Schlachtschiff H would have been superior to the G3. Neither battleship was built and as such conjecture. Yet the fact is when pitted against an older modernised battle cruiser and a modern battleship Bismarck came out on top but not unscathed. You are correct regarding the secondary fit aboard Bismarck as not being dual purpose .To provide AA defence all German Capitol ships of the period had the tri-axial 10.5cm in combination with the 3.7cm but when put to the test Bismarck’s flak defence was found wanting .
Bowwave
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As with all these things you can't take them at face value. Hood was never really modernised and her deck protection preceded the aviation era and was known to be quite inadequate which was why she was attempting to close the range sufficiently to take any hits on her belt armour which was on a par with the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes taking into account its inclination and probably just as good as that on Bismark at low trajectories. Unfortunately the original design assumed relatively low battle ranges and protection against plunging fire was not thought to be necessary in the pre Jutland era. It was too late to change things while the Hood was on the stocks which was why only one of the four ships was built. Hood was really just a fast version of the QE class with some improvements. She was vulnerable to plunging fire and paid the price.
Prince of Wales was unfit for battle at the time of the action with Bismarck, she was not fully worked up and much of her main armament was out of action for substantial periods due to technical faults for most of the battle. (KGV was still having breakdowns when she engaged the Bismark as well).
Admiral Holland might have been better advised to have led with Prince of Wales which was better able to stand up to Bismarck's fire at longer ranges and of course Hood initially opening up on Prinz Eugen instead of Bismarck didn't help matters.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing!
Colin
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Bismarck's armour belt was apparently made of Krupp cementite face hardened armour steel, which was developed post-WW1. Proving ground tests indicated it was only slightly less resistant than British cemented armour and the expeditions to the wreck have found no penetration holes in her armoured belt or armoured deck from British shells. So despite other deficiencies her armour was actually good.
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For naval engagements you deploy assets that are considered more than adequate for the job , in fact Hood received a considerable amount of armour between the wars and both Hood a Battle cruiser and the Prince of Wales where considered more than adequate to deal with Bismarck , because they performed badly does not say that Bismarck was inferior Hood was fitted with Radar for ranging . This was not a re-run of Coronel but an equal gun duel and Bismarck proved to be the better ship on the day and that is all it takes.
Bowwave
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Bismark was a sound but somewhat outdated design. Her important features were her beam and high speed which made her a problem for the RN to catch. One needs to reflect that all the treaties limited battleship construction to 35,000 tons (how that is measured is a very different topic!) but Bismark came in nearer 50,000 tons and a naval architect can do a lot with the additional displacement.
There has been criticism about her 6" secondary armamant as it was not dual purpose. It was not intended to be dual purpose. The Krigsmarine recognised that their battleships would in all probability be operating as solo units and going after commerce rather than a stand up pitched battle. The six inch guns were therfore a requirement to engage enemy crusiers whilst the main guns went for any battleship whilst attacking convoys. The Kriegsmarine recognised they did not have enough crusiers so they would probably have to fight both at the same time. Anything less than a six in gun did not have the stopping power needed.
In contrast the allies knew they had enough crusiers so their battleships would only have to fight other battleships so they devoted the weight into dual purpose secondary armamant. Powerfull enogh to deter destroyer attacks but light enough to be used in an ant-aircraft capacity
There was an earlier comment that Rodney only had armour piercing shells in the engagement with Bismark and this was a disadvantage. I disagree entirely and find this surprising but it didn't matter as battleships need armour piercing shells to sink each other. An armour piercing shell is not solid shot, it penetrates armour and then detonates between 30 and 40 feet further in, deep in the vitals, that is its purpose. High explosive shells do superficial damage but are unable to deliver the necessary destructive and cumulative damage needed to sink a battleship.
Bismarks armour protection was indeed based on the WW1 Baden class and it performed very well at shorter ranges which were typically found in the North Sea. Rodney had the power and protection to go one on one with Bismark but not the speed or probaby the fire control gear so why would Bismark engage? POW had the speed and the protection, which was much superior to Bismarks (POW belt was 14" and 15" thick v Bismarks 12". POW deck was 5" to 6" thick v about 4" in Bismark. In fact the KGV class were amoungst the most heavily protected battleships ever built. Their downfall was the atrocious 14" gun which was just powerfull enough (1,400 pound shell) but the mountings were dreadfully complicated so none of the class ever obtained their full fire power potential.
Interestingly DOY engaged and sank Scharnhorst with her 14" guns pounding her and perhaps more interesting is that in many ways Scharnhorst was better protected than Bismark. A detailed comparison is interesting!!
With the Hood POW engagement, in my opinuion POW should have stood off and engaged at extreeme range where Bismark was very vulnerable and let Hood get close in. Too may ifs and buts really as what happened is well known.
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Actually just to add a klittle more to this - during the Rodney/KGV/Bismark duel one of the reasons Bismark was so hard to sink was that her damage was invlicted from all directions leading to slow flooding wheras a list rapidly destroys a ships ability to fight. Also in time honoured fashion Rodney/KGV closed the range to get more hits. At relativly short range heavy shells come in pretty flat so they do not penetrate the vitals, just rearrange the wreckage. Long rang plunging shots are needed to destroy a battleship.
One final interesting statistic - it typically takes takes about about 12/18 heavy calibre hits to put a battleship out of action (unless amagazine is hit) and this has been fairly constand eve sice iron went to sea!
The problem is to get the hits as 95% tend to miss!
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You can discuss this sort of thing forever which is what makes it interesting! Re armour piercing shells, yes I know they were not solid but the bursting charge was very small, perhaps 5% of the shell weight and intended to break up the shell to let the fragments do kinetic damage to the ship's structure. Quite correct that after a while you are just rearranging the wreckage. Tovey would have liked a proportion of high explosive as he thought that this would add to the incendiary effect and give a greater likelihood of touching off a magazine.
I am currently reading the Battle of Jutland by the American Holloway Frost (only 99p on Kindle http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/B014RIJ0QK?psc=1&redirect=true&ref_=oh_aui_d_detailpage_o04_)
This gives an interesting American viewpoint on the battle which challenges generally held 'truths' although perhaps not always correctly. For example he considers that Evan Thomas' performance in handling the 5th Battle Squadron was quite masterly and heroic, not a commonly held view I would suggest! After WW1 the US Navy was not particularly well disposed towards the RN and even regarded it as a possible wartime threat. This attitude does show up a little in the analysis of the battle but at the moment I have only got to the point where Beatty is leading Hipper's battlecruisers towards the Grand Fleet. There is a bit of the 'we wouldn't have done that in the US navy' about it but when an American battle squadron was sent to join the Grand Fleet it was found that their gunnery was very bad.
Colin
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Yes, but the point is you can't get to a magazine with a high explosive shell, only an armour piercing round can get through the armour to set of the chain of events.
I had also read that when the American squadron joind the Grand Fleet in 1918 they were shocked at how good the gunnery was and how good the command and control of the squadrons were.
With the new sheels (greenboys) there was no doubt that by 1918 the Grand Fleet was the most effective battlefleet in the world by a big margin. We were overconfident in the early years of ww1 but by the end we had learned lots of lessons, had better equipment and more realistic training and methods and were supreme!!
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Just about all ships had their strengths and weaknesses in battle. As said above, Bismarck was a competent design but not the 'super ship' that many would like to think. Rodney was a clever design but restricted in speed due to tonnage limitation and the need to carry heavy armour and armament although her internal armour belt was actually quite shallow and would have been deepened if war had not intervened. The problems with the KGV armament were largely due to key skills being lost after WW1 due to the rundown of the heavy engineering industries (just as in the same way we can no longer build cruise ships in the UK as the skills are no longer there. I would think a KGV fitted with 15 inch guns might have been a better bargain - just like Vanguard!
I quite agree that if you are pounding away at your opponent at close range then compartments below the waterline will be relatively unscathed - that was true of Nelson's time as well. However high explosive can do a lot of damage even to well armoured ships as the South Dakota discovered when she was smothered by Japanese cruiser fire in WW2. The vitals of the ship were largely unaffected but much of the command and control functions were put out of action so that the ship became virtually blind and lost her effective fighting capability.
Colin
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Reading just some of the huge number of books on Jutland the conclusion was more that the German did not gain a Victory in the classic sense more as mentioned in an earlier post the battle was lost by the British in effect a scenario not that different from the battle of the Demark strait. On both accounts the British had superior fire power at their disposal but the ships were not up to the mark. The complete reversal of this was the battle of Tsushima where one fleet decimated the other. The Japanese had the superior numbers, fire power and deployed their ships more effectively than the Russians. Again the battle of the Falklands proved that with superior fire power, better ships and good judgement battles are won decisively. There are reams of data available on all of these battles but along with the judgements commander make there is an element of luck. It was pure luck that Bismarck took a hit which coursed a fuel problem which in turn necessitated a rethink as to the destination of the ship. This gave the FAA the chance which was taken and the result changed the fortunes of war. Equally if Jellico had kept his nerve and faced the death ride instead of turning way , he may well have lost ships but there was a good chance he would have turned the tide of battle decisively .
Bowwave
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Fair comment but Jellico didn't need to take a chance as the anticipation was the battle would resume the next day as he was between the Germans and their base, as it happens this was not to be. As Churchill said "Jellico was the only man on either side who could loose the war in an afternoon".
The war cabinet were fully in agreement with Jellico's battle orders, i.e turning away from a suspected mass torpedo attack. If you turn away the torpedo's gain more slowly so there it time to evade.
Too many ships were lost in the Russian Japanese war to mine on both sides that it was a serious concern. there is an excellent book on Jellico's tactics which illustrate the problems of trying to contain an enemy who is attempting to flee.
The fundamental problem was how do you catch an enemy who doesn't want to fight who can generally steam at the same speed you can!
At the Falklands and Dogger Bank our ships were faster and the enemy suffered.
I think generally the German battleships were probably better than our own but we had more and that was the point - only numbers can annihilate. Whilst our shells were not as good (and there is still a lot of dispute over this) they were certainly less effective at long range oblique angles but as the range closed they became just as effective where the greater weight of firepower may well have proved decisive. Our ships were not badly armoured. As I'm in the process of building a large model of Iron Duke I was suprised how extensive the armour was once fitted. Yes the Germans had heavier belt armour but they had to face heavier shells and the convers is true so the relative diffience in protection was probably not signficant albeit the German underwater protection was beter until QE and Revenge classes appeard then we were on parity. Again a point in question at the end of the war the Germans had two15" gun ships we had eight!
The Germans never intended to have a one on one with the Grand Fleet and the staggering shock for them was that we could deploy the whole fleet and catch them, the flaw was with the tacticts of the day we could not capitalise on the trap. Bear in mind Jellico crossed their "T" twice - not too bad at all!
The problems in control of a battlefleet that size were never really solved, too mucgh smoke and confusion to force a decision. The British generally though of a Trafalgar but in general most fleet actions usually ended in something of a stalemate unless the circumstances were exceptional, Trafalgar and Tuishima being the exception.
We also need to consider that the ships at Tuishima were already obsolete
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The Germans never intended to have a one on one with the Grand Fleet and the staggering shock for them was that we could deploy the whole fleet and catch them, the flaw was with the tacticts of the day we could not capitalise on the trap. Bear in mind Jellico crossed their "T" twice - not too bad at all!
The problems in control of a battlefleet that size were never really solved, too mucgh smoke and confusion to force a decision. The British generally though of a Trafalgar but in general most fleet actions usually ended in something of a stalemate unless the circumstances were exceptional, Trafalgar and Tuishima being the exception.
We also need to consider that the ships at Tuishima were already obsolete
Jellicoe did indeed cross Scheer’s T twice but he failed to capitalize on the manoeuvre to be quite frank he was out smarted by Scheer not once but twice and paid the penalty by for fitting the chance of a decisive outcome .. An interesting book and well worth a read is Germany’s High Sea Fleet in the World War by Admiral Scheer. Both Beatty and Jellicoe went into battle with a clear advantage in numbers , fire power and speed yet these margins where not decisive enough The night action following Jutland was more brawl than a fight .
It depends what you consider a fleet action Manila Bay May 1898 was a fleet action and it was decisive , Coronel was decisive , The Falklands . These did not have the number of warships of Tsushima or Jutland but they were considered fleet actions .
Bowwave
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Not sure how you reckon that Scheer outsmarted Jellicoe Dave! Both sides made mistakes but Scheer steamed right into the Grand Fleet not once but twice, had to make emergency turnaways and was very lucky to get home at all. His battlecruisers were all pretty much wrecked by the time they reached port and their best unit, Lutzow, had to be sunk. Several of Scheer's battleships were also very badly knocked about. The surviving British battlecruisers (with the exception of New Zealand which was unscathed) actually stood up to the German fire very well and were ready for sea long before their German counterparts. If the British had fixed their vulnerable ammunition supply arrangements before Jutland they probably would not have lost all of the three battlecruisers they did.
The day after the battle the British were in possession of the battlefield and the Germans were back in port.
Jellicoe never sought a night action because his ships were not trained for night fighting. He was expecting to re engage the next morning but his subordinates let him down by not reporting information that would have given him a better picture of where the Germans were. Scheer was desperately trying to get home and the disorganised flotillas at the rear of the British fleet allowed him through with just the loss of an old pre Dreadnought when he blundered through them.
But as Geoff says, ultimately it was Jellicoe's job to play safe, he was already in a position of strength. The High Seas Fleet was nicknamed the 'Luxury Fleet' because it was not essential to Germany's military capacity which was dependent on her army. The British Fleet on the other hand was vital to the survival of the Country and Jellicoe's tactics and actions were based upon that. Not exciting perhaps but it worked. Torpedoes, mines and submarines were relatively new weapons with unpredictable effects on the course of a surface action and Jellicoe saw no point in taking risks that he didn't need to. If he had sunk a good part of the HSF it wouldn't have made any real difference to the overall war situation but if the HSF had put a major proportion of the Grand Fleet out of action then things would have been very different indeed!
Colin
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What you say is partially true but many naval historians now view the battle of Jutland as a tactical win for the HSF . The basic fact is the British entered the battle with a fleet of 265ships whilst the HSF numbered 99 ships This was an overwhelming force with Jellicoe having had intercepts relayed from room 40 as to the position of the HSF . Beatty had at his disposal the QEs with their 15inch guns with the outcome as the British people had come to expect a forgone conclusion. Yet at the end of the day the Grand Fleet suffered 50% more casualties and lost more ships. But the strategic situation remained unchanged.
You are right that it was not Scheer’s intention to confront the entire Grand Fleet it was his strategy to whittle away at the edges until parity was achieved. I think this piece of naval history unlike any other can be mulled over for further 100 years as there is no defined point where either side can claim to use the word decisive. There is little doubt that the mauling inflicted on the HSF did change the emphasis of the war at Sea in WW1 towards the submarine which came uncomfortably close to achieving what the HSF could not do change the strategic situation .
Bowwave
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Jellicoe did indeed cross Scheer’s T twice but he failed to capitalize on the manoeuvre to be quite frank he was out smarted by Scheer not once but twice and paid the penalty by for fitting the chance of a decisive outcome ..
Utter flippin' nonsense.
1. Jellicoe deployed the Grand Fleet in precisely the right way to maximise its firepower. Crossed the tee, par excellence.
2. Jellicoe made the right decision to turn away from the subsequent torpedo attack to avoid unnecessary losses to the GF. Why should he risk it?
3. Scheer, in an amazing act of utter ineptitude, turned back into Jellicoe's tee, and was only saved by bad light.
If there's a 'what if?' at this stage, it's why did destroyer/cruiser squadrons not accurately report their night actions, and give Jellicoe a proper situational awareness at dawn?
End of ! ;)
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As said earlier people will argue this battle for generations to come, but as said Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war that day. Plus radio was in its infancy and plotting and giving accurate positions then was very poor, as navigation then out of sight of land was all dead reckoning ( intelligent guess work ). As to the British Battlecruisers it has since come out that they had permission given to increase their ammo loading 50% above designed amount which gave all the problems which lead directly to their destruction. Also prior to the war Jellico was given the task of investigating British Ammunition and Gunnery, so he probably knew its limitations.
As to Hood when the RN tried to get the money between the wars to improve her deck armour, the Treasury said no on the grounds that shells come through the sides not the deck!! But she was greatly outranged by both the Bismarck and her consort, as mentioned earlier she should have had the Prince of Wales leading, and in a computer assimilation game I had once it was the only way to take out the Bismarck, but I have heard unconfirmed reports that Hood went off at full speed leaving the Prince of Wales behind, so that both German ships could concentrate on Hood for some time. As for Bismarck she was sent to the bottom in approx. 45 minutes from start of action by the Rodney.
But like all things we can argue for ever, the real facts are human beings died in their thousands for their country in very nasty conditions, that is what we should really understand and remember.
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Yes, the 'Jutland Controversy' started immediately after the battle and has pretty much continued unabated to this day. I find it fascinating myself. It is also very interesting to read the biographies of the main characters which helps to understand their actions at the time.
Beatty agitated for a long time to have the 5th Battle Squadron under his command to bolster his battlecruisers but when he finally got his wish he didn't even bother to invite Evan-Thomas aboard Lion to discuss how they would work together before the battle. Beatty had a reputation for being impetuous and flamboyant which was why Jellicoe was reluctant to entrust him with such an important unit of the Grand Fleet. Horace Hood who commanded the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron was probably a better all round and more intelligent leader. Evan-Thomas was a competent but conventional admiral, imbued with the formalised practices of the Grand Fleet which meant that he was more inclined to wait for orders rather than anticipate them whilst Beatty, despite his other shortcomings, did expect his subordinates to use their initiative and was sometimes disappointed both at Jutland and at the Dogger Bank.
In some respects the QEs were a disappointment as they could not actually make their designed 25 knots which lessened their value as a fast wing of the Grand Fleet.
Beatty is an interesting character as, behind all the glamour and posing, he had a wretched private life being 'kept' by his rich American wife who bestowed her favours elsewhere which prompted Beatty to find his own female solace.
It was said that to make Beatty's eyes light up you only had to shine a torch in his ear but he proved to be a competent successor to Jellicoe and played a major role in the post war naval treaty negotiations. He could also behave very badly as in seeking to have the official records of Jutland changed in his favour and he drove his former flag lieutenant Ralph Seymour to suicide. yet he was also a pallbearer at the funeral of Earl Jellicoe although in poor health and died shortly afterwards himself.
I find the whole WW1 period and the times leading up to it to be quite fascinating myself.
Colin
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This topic seems to have gone a bit quiet but it offers some fascinating insights on naval warfare in WW1 and how it subsequently influenced subsequent naval development and policy in the post ware era which had an eventual impact on WW2.
Colin
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Okay, so lets bring it back to life again with a couple fo statements:
- Jellico knew that the underwater protection of his early dreadnoughts was not as good as it could be.
- The loss of Audatious shows how effective a mine can be if it goes off in the wrong(right) place
- Prewar battle practice showed that if a fleet in a long line was attacked on mass with torpedoes, even from long range, by probability something like 30% of ships would be hit because they all sailed in a long line close together to maximise firepower. This was known as a "browning attack". As it happens this was exposed to be overly pesimistic but why take a chance.
- The Germans had the same problem but figued if the worst thing possible happened and they fell under the massed guns of the Grand Fleet having crossed their "T" they should practice a battle turnaway - basically the last ship in the line does 180 degree turn followed immediatley by the next in line and so forth. To cover this withdrawl (run away) they planned to used mass torpedo attacks which is exacltly what Jellico feared.
- Why take the chance, turn away, minimise damage and finish the fight tomorrow.
- The reality is Hipper outfought Beatty (I seem to recall that Beatty chaged course just before the action which threw all the gunnery solutions and that the greater range of guns of the his battlecrusiers was not therefore explouited and the Germans actually opened fire first.
- However we need to reflect that whilst Hipper outfought Beattty, Beatty tactically outfought Hipper by leading his battlecrusiers into the guns of the Grand Fleet. The slight speed advantage ofthe british ships forced Hipper back on the HSF thus denying intelligence to Sheer.
- Sheer blundered obliviously into the guns of the GF. Whilst suffering unaceptable losses (due poor amunition handling) the british battlecrusiers tactically did exactly what they intended to do! So Jellico outfought Sheer, twice!
Let the debate continue!
G
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I think that's pretty much correct Geoff. Hipper was probably a better commander than either Beatty or Scheer.
I am still ploughing through the American analysis of the battle (wonderful just before going to sleep!) The author makes some good points but to my mind falls short in two areas. Firstly he is a bit too 'gung ho' and happy to sacrifice major ships to get a 'result' and secondly I don't think he has any real idea of North Sea weather conditions with shifting visibility (especially combined with the smoke) and the effect that it had on decision making.
He is however right in criticising Jellicoe's subordinates at all levels for their failures to keep the C in C informed at all stages of the battle and the time leading up to it. Even when reports were accurate they were often nullified by the reporting ship being miles out in its estimated position. Reporting would have been more effective if bearings etc. could have been given by reference to a point that both the reporting ship and the C in C could relate to, for example the position of the 5th Battle Squadron once fleet action had been joined. Many of the messages seem to have been very scrappy and not helpful to the recipients when they actually got through.
It is interesting to speculate what Jellicoe would have done had he realised that Scheer was actually passing astern of him during the night. Probably he would have hauled off to the eastwards to get between Scheer and his base for a daylight resumption of the fighting.
Something else which is perhaps not given enough emphasis is that on both sides many of the crews were exhausted from hard fighting and hours of strict concentration, something which was bound to have affected judgement. A good proportion of ships had also suffered severe damage and casualties which would have affected their fighting efficiency.
There were some odd occurrences though, such as the decision of the commander of some of Scheer's best destroyers to bale out and go home via the Kattegatt whilst the reluctance of Captain Fairie to take his forces into action during the night is inexplicable.
That's the thing about Jutland, it was such a complex operation that there are things to discuss whichever part of the battle you look at.
Colin
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In the photographs of these battleships I notice forward-facing diagonal boom like structures along the hulls and have always wondered what purpose they served, did they carry anti-torpedo nets?
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Yes, they were torpedo nets but most were removed as the war progressed as being unnecessary when the fleet was based at Scapa Flow. At Jutland, one of the German battlecruisers was hit causing the nets to come loose and trail in the water, they had to stop the ship to cut it away otherwise there was a good chance it would have got caught round the propellers.
Also, new improved larger and faster torpedoes could penetrate the nets anyway.
Colin
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Hi Colin, another point not often made is Jellicoe just prior to the war was tasked with inspecting the gunnery ability and effectiveness of the British guns and munitions, so actually knowing the problems he may have been a bit cautious off getting into a pell mell affair.
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After reading Gordon's rules of the game, I think Jellioce was the cautious man because of many things that happened in the 1890s but he was a man who understood the technology of the time, the shooting of the Grand Fleet was excellent compared to that of the Battlecruiser Fleet under Beatty. Evan-Thomas and Jellicoe were respectable men who knew their ships and were not afraid to get into battle, they wanted the best circumstances to engage the enemy which they would have had if Beatty had not rushed in. His direct order to increase the rate of fire which caused the stacking of cordite in the turrets, corridors and leaving the doors open which led to the loss of the two Battlecruisers under his command. If he understood his ship's abilities like Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas he wouldn't have lost his advantages and the battle would have perhaps ended very differently.
Jellicoe's standing orders were to maintain the blockade of the German Fleet and his turn away from the TBDs saved his fleet from the 31 torpedos that were fired at them, and with the German High Seas Fleet retreating in a well practiced manoeuvre with the first three leading battleships badly damaged, Jellicoe obeyed his orders and ensured the Royal Navy remained dominant and the blockade stood.
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How on earth do you enforce a blockade if your fleet is wracked and reduced to ineffect? You have to measure your desire to engage in an all out battle, to whit considerable losses would be acceptable, and play the long game. We made some mistakes but as a whole the RN helped the allies bring a major war to an armistice:O/
If things had been a bit different, Jutland II would have occurred in August IIRC.
Seeing some of the ships represented as models last weekend brought it home to me how pwerful the battlefleets were.
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Exactly correct Ian
Jellicoe did what was expected of him by the Admiralty but not by the British people. If he had turned towards the torpedos potentially he could have lost possibly 1/3 of his ships and reduced his numerical superiority over the German fleet. A lot of lessons were learnt from Jutland by the Royal Navy and a lot was forgotten by the Germans twenty years later in WW2. It just wasn't a trafalgar expected by the British public. The German admiralty was very good at propaganda but realised that their own people wouldn't believe it if they saw their ships after Jutland so they put up a huge wall around Kiel so they couldn't see the Seydlitz, Koeing, Grosser Kurfürst or any other battered ships as this would have destroyed the effect of the proclaimed victory. The Royal Navy had ships to replace the losses, the Germans didn't.
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We had Dreadnoughts in refit while the KM would still have had to rely on Predreadnoughts with but one Bayern to strengthen the battle line. The latter would have focussed Jellicoe's thoughts somewhat!
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I don't know why they didn't just give chase after the threat of the torpedoes, they knew where they were heading to, sitting offshore shelling the port and ships would have been a more safer option, running in at 12-14 miles before turning for a broadside before retreating to a safer distance from the shore batteries, it could have resulted in more KM losses - or was it just not cricket. {:-{
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The approaches to the German bases were thick with minefields.
Colin
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12-14 miles out?
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Oh I see, the danes may not have appreciated 150 uk warships pounding Germany off their coastline {-)
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Further out than that I believe plus there were also a number of submarines for coastal defence.
Colin
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The problem was that the visibility was very poor and Jellico did not know the direction of the Germans had taken. Remember after their first turn around the Germans did another and again Jellico crossed their "T". The lateness of the hour precluded against a major night engagement.
In terms of turning around and pursuing the Germans, firstly you have to know precisely which direction they went and secondly how do you catch a fleet steaming at 18 knots when you are steaming at 18 knots? No one has really answered this question!
Jellico knew and the Germans knew one of the tactics when fleeing the battle was to lay mines and torpedoes in their wake. This is exactly what the Japanese did at Tuishima with good effect.
Fundamentally why take a chance when you can finish them off the next day. The fact the German were able to slip away was just luck.
Many re-enactments of Jutland have been played out and none of them have produced a crushing victory or an easier solution. Even dividing the fleet was considered pre war but the danger of one section being overwhelmed was too great. Ships streaming in opposite directions for 10 mins are completely out of sight of each other.
Visibility was generally so bad the Germans blundered into Jellico and the same visibility let them get away.
Pre war exercises