A couple of small “asides”………
Looking back through reams of stuff, I came across an odd statistic.
Every ship I’d ever sailed in, from 1956 until 1992 ( this voyage), I’d been to somewhere I’d never been before (even if it was only Dundee). This one, nearing the end of my so-called “career” promised to break that record. And I remember that really pi**ed me off a bit. But there was a long way to go yet.
Secondly, working the flight deck on a “Fort” was not at all like being the FDO on an “OL” or any other RFA. On all ships other than the “Forts”, the FDO had direct, hands on, control of the flight deck. He controlled everything that went on there. He could communicate with both the bridge and the aircraft. The bridge via the HCO actually controlled the aircraft until the FDO took over at ¼ of a mile, and controlled the landing. I believe the pilot of the aircraft did have something to do with the landing, but what his job was, I’ve no idea.
But the “Forts”, ah, a different kettle of fish altogether. We had “FLYCO”. This was (and is) a mini copy of how aircraft carriers operate aircraft “doings”, so letting the bridge get along with what the bridge does best…have a cup of coffee and tell everybody else what to do. This method of working is (sort of) OK when the FDO and the bridge are the only links in a chain. “Flyco” was supposed to break that chain and let flight operations carry on without much in the way of bridge interference. But this is the RFA and not the RN. So “Flyco” rapidly became just another layer of non-essential clap trap. So the ships FDO, normally a well experienced First Officer, was given a new title. That of ships “Aviation Officer” (AVO). Under him (me) was an RN officer designated as AAVO (Assistant Aviation Officer….but you guessed that).
This AAVO did not necessarily have to have FDO qualifications. In fact, even after all these years, I’m still unsure. However. In general, no matter how experienced they were in flight deck operations, the RFA FDO was only ever qualified as an FDO2. This meant that he wasn’t qualified to do a few things. Unimportant stuff like supervising the arming of an aircraft, or controlling the driver of the “mangler” (the electrically driven tractor thing that was used to move the aircraft in and out of the hangar and so on). So other ways and means of keeping an aircraft “fit to fight” had to be found. And, as usual, it was fudged. Lines of demarcation at “lower levels” were easy. But when the lines of command came into practice it all became a bit tangled.
I’ve said often enough that the RFAs are civilian and civilian manned. But when that “civilian” ship has 4 “weapons ready” Sea Kings embarked, and with the facility to deploy them lines, understandably, get a bit blurred. Nobody but nobody wanted to take the final step here. Certainly not the political or MoD lot. Nor did the RN really, they just put up with it and kept their collective heads down. So where did that leave the Commanding Officer of the RFA? In a sharply clefted forked stick is my guess.
On one hand he was CO of the entire ship. As a civilian. But he also had a fighting aviation force equivalent to 2 frigates under his command. And the prime purpose of having a Flyco was thus undermined. It really is impossible to have 2 autonomous operating systems within one ship. Just “who” is in charge?
This might get a bit complicated now.
Although Flyco was always manned by an experienced FDO, the bridge retained control of all flying operations. One of my big bugbears was that very seldom were any of the bridge staff actually trained as an FDO. This had one main ramification. Landing or launching a helicopter, especially a big one like a Sea King, was always “wind dependent”. All aircraft have an “operating window”, deck movement, weight, load, air temperature and wind direction. It’s this last point that used to get to me. A lot. The bridge, FDO and Flyco all have the same “widgets” (the adopted name). A widget graphically shows the wind limits (direction and force) that the aircraft is capable of operating in.
Too complicated? Might get worse!
Simplify. An aircraft really prefers to take of or land into the wind. For simplicities sake let’s just agree that a Sea King likes the wind a few degrees off the port bow so it can land “fore and aft” on the deck. Especially when the pilot is in the right hand seat (opposite to your holiday flight). But with a helicopter the “widget” can be turned. The thing the bridge staff never seemed to understand was that the wind was relative to the aircraft, and not the ship. So. I used to recommend “off wind” or “cross deck” landings (only possible in daylight hours). Almost invariably the bridge would reject this and spend ages turning the ship so wasting an unbelievable amount of time.
To conclude this exposition, “Flyco” became just another layer within many others. The bridge retained control and flyco was just an unnecessary relay station. But that’s how it was during my 10 years off and on the “Forts”. I really do hope it’s all sorted out a lot better now.